The Law Library
Court decisions
When VA and a veteran disagree about what a rule means, the courts decide. These are the cases that still shape how claims get decided.
- How VA weighs evidence
- Service connection
- Exams and medical opinions
- Ratings, TDIU and SMC
- Claims, dates and appeals
- Supreme Court
How VA weighs evidence
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)
CAVC
When the evidence for and against a claim is roughly even, the veteran wins. The Board must also explain its reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence, so the decision can be reviewed.
"when a veteran seeks benefits and the evidence is in relative equipoise, the law dictates that veteran prevails."
Why it matters: It is the founding statement of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule and the Board's duty to give reasons for its findings.
Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
Fed. Cir.
Lay testimony can establish a diagnosis in some situations: when a layperson can identify the condition, is reporting what a doctor told them at the time, or describes symptoms that a doctor later diagnoses. The Veterans Court was wrong to say a medical diagnosis always needs medical evidence.
"Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition"
Why it matters: It means a veteran's own account, and those of family and buddies, can count as competent evidence on some medical questions.
Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
Fed. Cir.
The Board cannot decide that a veteran's lay evidence is not credible just because there are no medical records from the time to back it up. The Board may weigh the missing records, but their absence alone is not enough.
"the lack of such records does not, in and of itself, render lay evidence not credible."
Why it matters: It protects veterans whose service or treatment records are thin or missing.
Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Fed. Cir.
The Veterans Court was wrong to say a medical opinion is always required to prove a link (nexus) between service and a condition. Whether lay evidence is competent on nexus has to be decided case by case.
"the Veterans Court in this case stated categorically that “a valid medical opinion” was required to establish nexus"
Why it matters: It blocks VA from rejecting lay evidence on the link question across the board without looking at the specific facts.
Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991)
CAVC
The Board may not substitute its own medical opinion for the medical evidence. It must rely on independent medical evidence, and it can get more if the record is lacking.
"BVA panels may consider only independent medical evidence to support their findings."
Why it matters: If the Board rejects a doctor's opinion based on its own medical reasoning, that is reversible error.
Later history: PARTLY OVERRULED. Its 'reasonable possibility of changing the outcome' test for new and material evidence was rejected by Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The reopening standard has since changed again (38 CFR 3.156(a) amended 2001; Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010)), and AMA claims use 'new and relevant' evidence. The no-Board-medical-opinion rule remains widely cited.
Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
Fed. Cir.
Unless there is specific evidence otherwise, VA is presumed to have reviewed all evidence in the record when it made its decision. It does not have to discuss every piece of evidence in a regional office decision.
"all evidence contained in the record at the time of the RO’s determination of the service connection must be presumed to have been reviewed"
Why it matters: Arguing that VA 'ignored' evidence requires more than pointing out that it was not mentioned.
Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc in part)
Fed. Cir.
The benefit of the doubt applies when the evidence is in 'approximate balance,' meaning nearly equal. It does not apply when the evidence persuasively favors one side.
"when the evidence persuasively favors one side or the other"
Why it matters: It defines how close the evidence has to be for the tie to go to the veteran.
Service connection
Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995)
CAVC
A claim needs evidence of a current disability, an in-service disease or injury, and a medical link between the two. For combat veterans under 38 U.S.C. 1154(b), 'satisfactory' lay evidence of what happened in combat means credible evidence.
"in order for a claim to be well grounded, there must be competent evidence of current disability (a medical diagnosis)"
Why it matters: It is the source of the three-part service-connection framework still cited in nearly every Board decision.
Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Fed. Cir.
A veteran must show a current disability, an in-service disease or injury (or aggravation), and a causal link between them. The court also said 38 U.S.C. 105(a) creates a presumption that a disability first showing up during service is service connected, but that presumption does not replace the need to prove a current disability and a link.
"in order to establish service connection or service-connected aggravation for a present disability the veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability"
Why it matters: It is the Federal Circuit's standard statement of the three things every service-connection claim has to prove.
Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
Fed. Cir.
Pain alone, without a specific diagnosis, can be a 'disability' for service connection if it causes functional impairment of earning capacity. The Veterans Court erred by holding otherwise.
"a veteran will need to show that her pain reaches the level of a functional impairment of earning capacity."
Why it matters: It opened service connection for chronic pain that doctors cannot tie to a named diagnosis.
Later history: Rejected the 'pain alone is not a disability' rule from Sanchez-Benitez v. West (1999). The court stressed a veteran cannot win just by asserting subjective pain, and the in-service and nexus elements still apply.
Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Fed. Cir.
Proving service connection through 'continuity of symptomatology' under 38 CFR 3.303(b) is only available for the chronic diseases listed in 38 CFR 3.309(a).
"the regulation is only available to establish service connection for the specific chronic diseases listed in § 3.309(a)."
Why it matters: Veterans with conditions not on that list must prove a link another way, usually with a medical opinion.
Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995) (en banc)
CAVC
A veteran can be compensated when a service-connected condition makes a non-service-connected condition worse, but only for the extra degree of disability caused by that worsening.
"shall be compensated for the degree of disability (but only that degree) over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation."
Why it matters: It is the basis for secondary service connection by aggravation.
Later history: LIMITED BY REGULATION. Effective 2006 (71 FR 52744-52747, Sept. 7, 2006), 38 CFR 3.310(b) codified aggravation but added a requirement: VA will not concede aggravation unless a baseline level of severity is shown by medical evidence from before the aggravation, or the earliest medical evidence after it. Two judges dissented in Allen.
El-Amin v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 136 (2013)
CAVC
A medical opinion that a condition is 'not caused by' a service-connected disability does not answer whether the service-connected disability made it worse. The Board cannot rely on an opinion that skips the aggravation question.
"the Board erred in relying on an inadequate medical opinion to conclude that Mr. El-Amin’s non-service-connected alcoholism was not aggravated"
Why it matters: Secondary claims need an opinion on both causation and aggravation.
Exams and medical opinions
McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006)
CAVC
VA must provide a medical exam when there is evidence of a current disability, an in-service event or injury, an indication that the two may be linked, and not enough medical evidence to decide the claim. The 'may be linked' part is a low bar.
"this element requires only that the evidence “indicates” that there “may” be a nexus between the two. This is a low threshold."
Why it matters: It is the test for when VA owes a veteran a C&P exam.
Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007)
CAVC
Once VA decides to give an exam, even if it did not have to, the exam must be adequate, or VA must tell the veteran why one will not be provided. A layperson is competent to identify varicose veins because they can be seen.
"even if not statutorily obligated to do so, he must provide an adequate one"
Why it matters: It is the rule that a bad VA exam is not good enough just because VA was not required to order it.
Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007)
CAVC
A medical opinion that only states a bare conclusion, without explaining why, is not enough for the Board to rely on. An adequate opinion must give reasoning the Board can weigh against other opinions.
"We hold only that a mere conclusion by a medical doctor is insufficient to allow the Board to make an informed decision"
Why it matters: It is the tool for challenging a one-line negative VA opinion.
Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008)
CAVC
Most of a medical opinion's value comes from its reasoning, not from whether the doctor read the claims file. The Board cannot favor a VA opinion over a private one just because the VA examiner reviewed the file.
"most of the probative value of a medical opinion comes from its reasoning."
Why it matters: It puts private medical opinions on equal footing with VA opinions when their reasoning is sound.
Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447 (2007)
CAVC
VA's practice of testing hearing in a sound-controlled room is valid. But a VA audiologist must also describe the functional effects of the hearing loss in the report, not just the test numbers.
"a VA audiologist must fully describe the functional effects caused by a hearing disability in his or her final report."
Why it matters: Hearing exams have to address how the hearing loss affects daily life and work, which matters for extraschedular ratings.
Acevedo v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 286 (2012)
CAVC
VA examiners do not have to write formal 'reasons and bases' like the Board does. A medical report is read as a whole, and the Board may draw reasonable inferences from it. The 'fear of hostile military activity' rule in 38 CFR 3.304(f)(3) does not apply to PTSD claims based on military sexual trauma.
"there is no reasons or bases requirement imposed on examiners."
Why it matters: It sets the standard VA uses to defend short exam reports, and it tells MST claimants which PTSD rule applies to them.
Monzingo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 97 (2012)
CAVC
A medical opinion that lacks an explicit rationale can still be adequate if, read as a whole, its basis is clear and it fully informs the Board. Outside studies VA helped publish were not automatically part of the record.
"the medical report must be read as a whole"
Why it matters: It shows that a short opinion is not inadequate by default, which cuts against a common appeal argument.
Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 405 (1994)
CAVC
For a condition that flares and goes quiet, an exam done during an inactive stage may be inadequate. VA must try to examine the veteran during an active stage.
"the Board must provide for the conduct of an adequate examination during the active stage of appellant’s tinea pedis"
Why it matters: Veterans with cyclical conditions can ask for an exam timed to a flare.
Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
Fed. Cir.
VA's duty to tell a claimant what evidence is needed must be met with notice before the initial decision, not by piecing it together from later documents. A reviewing court also cannot uphold a Board decision on a reason the Board did not rely on.
"That duty of affirmative notification is not satisfied by various post-decisional communications"
Why it matters: It is the basis for timing-of-notice errors and for the rule that courts review the Board's actual reasoning.
Ratings, TDIU and SMC
DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995)
CAVC
When rating a joint by range of motion, VA must consider extra loss of function from pain, weakness, and fatigue on repeated use and during flare-ups, under 38 CFR 4.40 and 4.45.
"does not forbid consideration of a higher rating based on a greater limitation of motion due to pain on use including during flare-ups."
Why it matters: It is why joint exams must address flare-ups and repeated use, not just a single range-of-motion reading.
Later history: Refined by Mitchell v. Shinseki (2011), which held pain alone is not functional loss, and Sharp v. Shulkin (2017) on how examiners must handle flare-ups.
Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 32 (2011)
CAVC
Pain by itself is not a functional loss for range-of-motion ratings. Pain counts when it actually limits function, and exams must address loss during flare-ups and repeated use as DeLuca requires.
"The Court holds that pain alone does not constitute a functional loss under VA regulations that evaluate disability based upon range-of-motion loss."
Why it matters: It sets the line between painful motion that raises a joint rating and pain that does not.
Correia v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 158 (2016)
CAVC
The last sentence of 38 CFR 4.59 requires joint exams to test for pain on active and passive motion, weight-bearing and non-weight-bearing, and against the opposite undamaged joint when possible.
"the final sentence of § 4.59 creates a requirement that certain range of motion testing be conducted whenever possible in cases of joint disabilities."
Why it matters: An exam that skips these tests can be challenged as inadequate.
Sharp v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 26 (2017)
CAVC
A VA examiner cannot refuse to estimate loss of function during flare-ups just because the veteran is not having one at the exam. The examiner must gather information about the flare-ups from the veteran and the record and estimate the loss, or explain why that cannot be done.
"the September 2015 VA examiner did not elicit information from Mr. Sharp regarding his flares' severity, frequency, duration, or functional loss manifestations"
Why it matters: It stops the common 'cannot say without speculation, no flare today' exam answer.
Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009)
CAVC
A request for TDIU (total disability based on individual unemployability), whether stated by the veteran or raised by the record, is not a separate claim. It is part of the claim for the right rating for the underlying disability.
"a request for TDIU, whether expressly raised by a veteran or reasonably raised by the record, is not a separate claim for benefits"
Why it matters: If evidence of unemployability shows up during a rating claim or appeal, VA must address TDIU as part of that claim, which can affect the effective date.
Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Fed. Cir.
When a veteran seeks the highest rating and submits evidence of unemployability, VA must consider TDIU even if the veteran did not ask for it by name. Proving TDIU does not require proof of 100 percent unemployability.
"proving inability to maintain “substantially gainful occupation” for entitlement to TDIU does not require proving 100 percent unemployability."
Why it matters: VA has to read a claim generously and consider TDIU when the record raises it.
Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436 (2002)
CAVC
The symptoms listed in the mental disorder rating formula (38 CFR 4.130) are examples, not a checklist. VA must look at all symptoms and their effect on work and social functioning.
"the symptoms after that phrase are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list, but rather are to serve as examples"
Why it matters: A veteran does not need every listed symptom to get a higher mental health rating.
Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
Fed. Cir.
To get a given mental health rating, a veteran must show the symptoms tied to that level, or others of similar severity, frequency, and duration, and those symptoms must cause the level of impairment described.
"a veteran may only qualify for a given disability rating under § 4.130 by demonstrating the particular symptoms associated with that percentage"
Why it matters: Mental health ratings turn on symptoms and how severe and frequent they are, not just a general impression of impairment.
Golden v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 221 (2018)
CAVC
Because VA adopted the DSM-5, which dropped the GAF scale, the Board errs when it uses GAF scores to assign a psychiatric rating in cases governed by the DSM-5.
"the Court holds that the Board errs when it uses GAF scores to assign a psychiatric rating in cases where the DSM-5 applies."
Why it matters: A low-looking or high-looking GAF number should not decide a modern mental health rating.
Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111 (2008)
CAVC
The court set a three-step test for extraschedular ratings under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1): whether the rating schedule fails to describe the veteran's disability, whether there are related factors like frequent hospitalization or marked interference with work, and if so, referral to the Director of Compensation Service.
"The determination of whether a claimant is entitled to an extraschedular rating under § 3.321(b) is a three-step inquiry"
Why it matters: It is the roadmap for arguing a rating above what the schedule allows.
Later history: Affirmed, Thun v. Shinseki, 572 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Later refined: Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014) required considering the combined effect of multiple disabilities. The current text of 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1) (amended through 84 FR 170, Jan. 18, 2019) now speaks of a schedular evaluation 'inadequate to rate a single service-connected disability' and names the Director of Compensation Service, so check the current regulation before relying on the steps.
Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999)
CAVC
When a veteran appeals the first rating assigned after service connection is granted, VA can assign different ratings for different periods ('staged ratings') based on the evidence. An appeal of an initial rating is different from a new claim for an increase.
"at the time of an initial rating “separate ratings can be assigned for separate periods of time based on facts found”"
Why it matters: On an initial-rating appeal, VA must look at the whole period since the effective date, not just current severity.
Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007)
CAVC
Staged ratings also apply to claims for an increased rating, when the evidence shows distinct time periods with symptoms warranting different ratings.
"staged ratings are appropriate for an increased-rating claim when the factual findings show distinct time periods"
Why it matters: VA should not lock a veteran into one rating for the whole appeal period if the condition got worse partway through.
Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008)
CAVC
A TDIU rating based on one disability can satisfy the 'rated as total' requirement for special monthly compensation at the housebound rate (SMC-S) under 38 U.S.C. 1114(s). VA should have checked whether TDIU was warranted on one disability alone before replacing it with a combined 100 percent rating.
"the Secretary should have assessed whether Mr. Bradley’s TDIU rating was warranted based on his PTSD alone"
Why it matters: It is how a veteran on TDIU can qualify for SMC-S.
Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242 (2010)
CAVC
TDIU based on several disabilities together does not meet the single-disability requirement for SMC-S. But VA's duty to maximize benefits means it must check whether any one disability supports TDIU on its own.
"a total disability rating based on individual unemployability that is based on multiple underlying disabilities cannot satisfy the section 1114(s) requirement of “a service-connected disability”"
Why it matters: It explains when TDIU will and will not open the door to SMC-S.
Floore v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 376 (2013)
CAVC
For a veteran with several service-connected disabilities, VA is not automatically required to get one medical opinion on their combined effect before deciding TDIU. The Board must still explain how the evidence supports its finding on their combined effect.
"such an examination is not required per se as a matter of statute, regulation, or policy."
Why it matters: It limits a common TDIU argument but keeps the Board's duty to explain.
Claims, dates and appeals
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009)
CAVC
A veteran who claims one mental condition, like PTSD, is claiming benefits for his symptoms, not a single diagnosis. VA must consider other diagnoses in the record that fit those symptoms.
"did not file a claim to receive benefits only for a particular diagnosis, but for the affliction his mental condition, whatever that is, causes him."
Why it matters: A claim does not fail because the veteran, who is not a doctor, named the wrong diagnosis.
Brokowski v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 79 (2009)
CAVC
A claim must show intent to apply, identify the benefit sought, and be in writing. Asking for benefits for 'all disabilities of record' was too vague to be an informal claim for a condition not otherwise identified.
"(1) an intent to apply for benefits, (2) an identification of the benefits sought, and (3) a communication in writing"
Why it matters: It explains why early, vague filings may not lock in an earlier effective date.
Later history: Decided under the old informal-claim rule. Since March 24, 2015, VA requires a standard claim form, and an Intent to File preserves the date (38 CFR 3.155 as amended). The court said 'all disabilities of record' plus specific records might be enough in other circumstances.
Supreme Court
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011)
U.S. Supreme Court
The 120-day deadline to appeal a Board decision to the Veterans Court is not jurisdictional, so a late appeal can sometimes be allowed under equitable tolling.
"We hold that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional attributes."
Why it matters: A veteran who missed the court deadline for good reason may still get heard.
Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019)
U.S. Supreme Court
Courts may still defer to an agency's reading of its own regulation (Auer deference), but only if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after using all normal tools of interpretation, the agency's reading is reasonable, and the reading reflects the agency's authoritative, considered judgment.
"Auer deference is sometimes appropriate and sometimes not."
Why it matters: It limits how far VA's own interpretations of its regulations can be used against a veteran.
Later history: Vacated and remanded; it did not decide Mr. Kisor's claim. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) overruled Chevron deference to agency readings of statutes, but did not overrule Kisor's rule for regulations. Citation from Google Scholar and CourtListener citation lookup (588 U.S. 558).
Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S. 1 (2023)
U.S. Supreme Court
The one-year rule in 38 U.S.C. 5110(b)(1), which lets benefits start the day after discharge if the claim is filed within a year, cannot be extended by equitable tolling, even for a veteran too ill to file.
"Equitably tolling this provision would depart from the terms that Congress “specifically provided.”"
Why it matters: File within one year of discharge to get the earliest possible effective date; there is no hardship exception to that window.
Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369 (2025)
U.S. Supreme Court
VA's decision that the evidence is or is not in 'approximate balance' is mainly a factual call. The Veterans Court reviews it only for clear error, not from scratch.
"we hold that the VA’s determination that the evidence is in approximate balance is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error."
Why it matters: It makes the benefit-of-the-doubt fight mostly a battle at VA and the Board, so the record must be built there.
This is general education, not legal advice, and not from the VA. Laws and regulations change, so always check the official source linked on each entry. For advice on your own claim, work with a free VA-accredited representative or a Veterans Service Organization. We are not the VA and are not affiliated with the VA.